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ABSTRACT  
This paper tests the efficiency of local provision of land conservation. I examine how 
housing prices, which capitalize open space amenities and future tax obligations, change after 
municipalities vote on referendums for conservation spending. Using a dynamic regression 
discontinuity based on voting outcomes, results suggest that average housing prices increase 
about 0.68-1.12% for every $1000 per household of open space spending authorized, which 
indicates inefficiency and underprovision of conservation. I also examine tax capitalization 
and supply side explanations for estimated capitalization.  
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1  INTRODUCTION  
A fundamental uncertainty in economics is the efficiency of local provision of public 
goods. Tiebout (1956) showed that a market solution exists to the local public good problem, 
namely that households shop for a residential location that offers the optimal bundle of 
services, taxes, and housing prices given their budget. Through competition for residents, 
local governments respond to demand, and an efficient allocation of public goods is attained. 
Despite this theoretical optimism, there are reasons that inefficient provision may be 
prevalent. First, the necessary equilibrium conditions of Tiebout are extreme and often 
rejected by empirical findings (Ross and Yinger 1999). Second, academic and especially 
political concerns persist about Leviathan governments maximizing budgets beyond the point 
of efficiency. Third, at least partially in response to those concerns, all but a few states either 
severely limit tax increases or require municipalities to hold votes to raise taxes or issue 
bonds (Ballotpedia 2016), which may lead to inefficient under-provision of services by 
limiting the ability of local governments to respond to demand.1  
This paper examines the efficiency of local public good provision in the context of open 
space conservation. Urban sprawl has been a major trend in the United States over the last 60 
years. The number of people living in suburban areas increased 154% between 1960 and 2000, 
triple the rate of overall population growth (Hobbs and Stoops 2002). With this expansion comes 
the development of open space lands in the urban-rural fringe; U.S. Forest Service (2016) 
estimates that 5760 acres of open space are developed every day in the United States. Open 
space provides myriad benefits for people, spanning recreation and visual amenities to ecosystem 
services and rural character.2 However, the sum of these benefits for a community’s residents is 
not internalized by private landowners, and thus land conservation is an important public good 
provided by local governments, as well as state and federal governments and NGOs.  
The specific empirical setting I consider is municipal open space referendums, which if 
passed will raise taxes to pay for permanent conservation of undeveloped lands through outright 
                                                 
1 Forty-one states require a municipal vote to raise taxes or issue bonds (Ballotpedia 2016), and this had led to a 
prevalence of local referendums. For example, California municipalities alone hold about 500 referendums per 
election (Ballotpedia 2016) and municipal referendums have been held in 57 of 58 counties between 1998-2012 
(Legislative Analyst’s Office 2014); 98.4% of Ohio’s municipalities voted on property tax increases for education 
during 1990-2007 (Isen 2014); 85% of Rhode Island’s municipalities voted on some type of local referendum in 
either 2012 or 2014 (Rhode Island Board of Elections 2016). 
2 The term open space encapsulates many land uses, including forests, wetlands, prairie, hiking trails, agriculture, 
parks, sports fields, and more. The unifying feature is a lack of built environment.  
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purchase or more often purchase of development rights. The test of efficiency, which stems from 
the seminal work of Oates (1969) and Brueckner (1979), examines how municipal housing prices 
respond if a referendum is passed and hence taxes are raised. Housing prices reflect the net of 
households’ valuation of locally conserved land and the cost of taxes. If prices are unresponsive, 
then public goods are efficiently provided. However, if prices change, this indicates inefficiency, 
with increasing prices pointing to underprovision and decreasing prices overprovision. To 
address this question, I build a panel dataset of 1,145 municipal referendums occurring in the 
United States and community-level median housing prices from Zillow for years 1997-2013. 
An empirical concern when estimating the relationship between housing prices and 
municipal land conservation spending is the endogeneity of spending levels. To mitigate this 
endogeneity, I take advantage of the fact that sample municipalities vote to authorize 
conservation spending and implement a regression discontinuity (RD) research design based on 
voting outcomes. Essentially, I compare house price changes in communities that barely pass a 
referendum to those that barely fail. This framework stems from a substantial literature that has 
used election outcomes for causal inference (e.g., Lee et al. 2004, Lee 2008, Solé-Ollé and 
Viladecans-Marsal 2013, Albouy 2013, Martorell et al 2016, Jerch et al. 2017).3 
The standard RD design is complicated by two aspects of municipal open space 
referendums. First, municipalities can and do hold more than one referendum, which necessitates 
incorporating dynamics into the model. Following the model developed by Cellini et al. (2010), I 
implement a dynamic RD estimator that conditions treatment effects on other referendums a 
community has held. Second, these referendums often couple open space funding with funding 
for other uses, such as affordable housing and historic preservation. If the house price impacts of 
open space spending are different than spending on other priorities, then the estimated effect of 
simply passing a referendum will be an average of those impacts and a biased estimate of open 
space valuation. To address this, I modify the dynamic RD design to include approved funding 
amounts for each type of spending, normalized by the number of housing units in a municipality, 
instead of a binary pass variable. 
The results suggest that $1,000 per household of referendum authorized open space 
spending increases housing prices in the range of 0.68-1.12% in years one through 10 post 
                                                 
3 Caughey and Sekhon (2011) raise concerns about necessary assumptions being false in electoral RD designs, but 
Eggers et al. (2015) largely validate the practice.  
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approval, with an upward trend over time. In contrast, spending on other purposes (e.g., 
affordable housing, historic preservation) has a statistically insignificant impact on housing 
prices. This suite of results is robust to a number of functional form assumptions and changes in 
the selection of the sample. While land conservation provides amenities, it also reduces the 
supply of developable land. As a result, the estimated price response may be a combination of 
these forces, which push prices in the same direction and are difficult to disentangle.4 However, 
additional tests involving geographic restrictions in supply (in the vein of Saiz 2010) and 
construction responses do not support a supply side effect.  
There are three primary contributions of this paper. First, this paper adds new findings to 
the debate over the efficiency of local public good provision. While Tiebout’s (1956) model 
suggests efficient provision, other theoretical work argues overprovision is likely (Yinger 1985, 
Caplan 2001). Empirical work has had mixed findings as well with Brueckner (1979) indicating 
overprovision, Brueckner (1982) efficient provision, and Barrow and Rouse (2004) and Cellini et 
al. (2010) underprovision. My findings of positive capitalization suggest that increasing open 
space increases efficiency, as households value the conserved land more than the costs of 
conservation. The vast majority of papers empirically testing efficiency do so in the context of 
aggregate municipal expenditures or school expenditures.5 Interestingly, the ratio of 
capitalization to taxes is larger in my paper than in Barrow and Rouse (2004) and Cellini et al. 
(2010), which both examine school expenditures. One interpretation of this comparison is that 
while education and open space are both underprovided, open space provision is relatively more 
inefficient, which could result from households optimizing location choice over multiple public 
goods and school quality being more of a priority than open space.  
Second, this paper offers two empirical tests of important assumptions in local public 
finance. The first is that municipal taxes are capitalized into housing prices: if two identical 
houses are located in municipalities with different tax rates, then the values of the two houses 
will differ by exactly the difference in present value of the stream of future tax payments. While 
                                                 
4 Balsdon (2012) elucidates these dual motivations for land conservation voting particularly well. He finds some but 
not conclusive evidence that voting decisions are affected by homeowner rent seeking.  
5 One example outside these contexts and closely related to this paper is Heintzelman (2010), who examines the 
efficiency of municipal open space spending in Massachusetts. Besides scope of sample, the key differences are his 
use of a difference-in-differences research design and estimating the effect of passing a referendum without 
decoupling spending for open space and spending for other purposes. He finds on average a negative house price 
response indicating overprovision, but some heterogeneity exists across different counties. 
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perfectly intuitive, this is difficult to empirically validate given that taxes and local public goods 
are highly correlated. Do and Sirmans (1994) and Palmon and Smith (1998) use settings in which 
the tax rates differ between two areas but the services do not and find strong evidence of full 
capitalization and reasonable discount rates. In contrast to these papers and others testing tax 
capitalization that use cross sectional variation, my test of tax capitalization uses within variation 
and posits that capitalization should increase over time as future tax obligations decrease but 
public goods stay constant. The results do suggest capitalization increases over time by a 
magnitude that is reasonably consistent with expectations, thus supporting the theory of tax 
capitalization. The second theory is Ficshel’s (2001) homevoter hypothesis. In his book, he 
argues that homeowners will vote on local public finance issues with the value of their house in 
mind. In model specifications that just focus on pass versus fail and do not disaggregate funding, 
the results suggest no statistically significant house price capitalization. This finding is consistent 
with the homevoter hypothesis because in the RD design median voters in referendums near the 
threshold are indifferent. This result adds to the seminal work of Sonstelie and Portney (1980), as 
well as the more recent Dehring et al. (2008) and Aldfeldt and Maennig (2015), who also find 
empirical support for the homevoter motivation.  
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on the valuation of open space by applying 
concepts from local public finance. Hedonic valuation of open space is a familiar topic in 
environmental and urban economics; McConnell and Walls (2005) survey the literature and 
identify 40 hedonic studies focused on open space through 2003, and there have been dozens 
more since then.6 Typically, these papers use proximity to open space as the key identifying 
variation to estimate willingness to pay (e.g., Irwin 2002, Anderson and West 2006). A concern 
here is that only the differential benefit of conservation can be estimated, and total benefits may 
be larger as they extend to non-proximate households (Abbott and Klaiber 2011). In contrast, I 
focus on municipal decisions of open space provision and assess the efficiency of the level of 
provision.  
 
 
                                                 
6 In addition, there is a substantial literature seeking to estimate demand for open space using voting data (e.g., 
Deacon and Shapiro 1975, Altonji et al. 2016, Burkhardt and Chan 2017), including several using the same 
LandVote data used in this paper (e.g., Kotchen and Powers 2006, Nelson et al. 2007, Banzhaf et al. 2010, 
Heintzelman et al. 2013, Kroetz et al. 2014). 
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2  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section describes a simple theoretical framework that illustrates the logic of the 
paper. The gist of the model is as follows. First, all households choose where to live based on 
amenities, housing prices, taxes, and their budget. Having chosen a location, households can vote 
to increase taxes in order to increase local public goods provision. If public goods do change, 
then housing values will likely change due to some households re-optimizing their location 
decision. Through the theory, three testable predictions are derived: a test of the efficiency of 
local public good provision, a dynamic test of tax capitalization, and a test of the homevoter 
hypothesis. I now present the formal model, which draws on the models of Brueckner (1979) and 
Cellini et al. (2010), as well as the arguments of Fischel (2001). 
There are J communities that are distinguished by different levels of public goods, such 
as schools and open space, and different housing costs and tax rates. Think of these J 
communities as being in the same metro area, and moving is costless among the J communities, 
but is prohibitively expensive to move to another metro area. Households prefer higher levels of 
public goods all else equal, but they are costly to enjoy as tax burdens and housing costs will be 
greater in high public good communities. In choosing where to live, household h seeks to 
maximize utility over the set of J locations subject to a budget constraint:                                   𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀{𝑗𝑗}𝑈𝑈ℎ�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗�,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗, 𝑐𝑐ℎ�                               (1) 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 𝑤𝑤ℎ ≥ 𝑐𝑐ℎ + 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 + 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 
Where 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is a measure of the quality of local, government supplied public goods in community j, 
which is a function of 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗, the community-specific annual taxes (i.e., property taxes) paid to 
support public goods. 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗′(𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗) > 0, but could be small if government is inefficient. 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 is a vector 
of location attributes that are not supplied through taxation, such as commuting distance to work, 
𝑐𝑐ℎ is consumption of a numeraire good, 𝑤𝑤ℎ is income, and 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 is the annual price of housing. For 
now, consider taxes and housing prices fixed in all communities.  
Households choose to live in a community with the locus of prices and public goods that 
best fits their preferences. From Equation (1), we can define the indirect utility of household h as 
𝑈𝑈ℎ�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗�,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗,𝑤𝑤ℎ − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 − 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗�. Then the Implicit Function Theorem defines the household’s 
7 
maximum bid for housing in community j, 𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑗𝑗 = 𝑔𝑔ℎ(𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 ,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗).7 Household h will choose 
community j if 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑗𝑗.  
Equilibrium in the housing market is defined as a set of taxes and prices �𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗∗,𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗∗� for all 
J and housing allocations such that no household could be made better off by moving. In order 
for equilibrium to be reached, housing prices will adjust until supply equals demand in each 
community. If the number of households that choose community j based on prices 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 exceeds the 
number of housing units in community j, then prices will increase above the maximum bid of 
some households and those households will choose a different community.  
For several reasons, such as heterogeneity in preferences over 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 and 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗, it is possible 
that a household would prefer a level of 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 > 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗∗, even when j is their preferred community in 
equilibrium.8 The 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 residents of community j can vote to authorize increasing 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 to better fit 
their preferences. Suppose there is a referendum in community j to raise taxes to 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗∗′ > 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗∗. If the 
referendum passes, households will re-sort among the J communities to maximize utility, which 
may impact housing prices. By differentiating the implicit function that defines 𝑔𝑔ℎ�𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗�, we 
can investigate how housing bids would respond to a change in taxes: 
𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔ℎ(𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 ,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗) 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗
= 𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈ℎ𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈ℎ
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐ℎ
− 1 = 𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈ℎ𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 − 𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐ℎ
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈ℎ
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐ℎ
                      (2) 
Equation (2) shows that housing bids increase if the product of the utility value of public goods 
(𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈ℎ 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗⁄ ) and the efficiency of government to provide those goods (𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗⁄ ) exceeds the 
utility lost from forgone consumption (𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈ℎ 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐⁄ ) due to paying extra taxes. We can think of 
Equation (2) describing an inverse-U relationship between housing prices and public good levels. 
The efficient level of public goods is when 𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔ℎ 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗⁄ = 0, that is housing prices are unresponsive 
to marginal changes in taxes. At inefficiently low levels of public goods, increases in taxes will 
cause housing prices to increase, 𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔ℎ 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗⁄ > 0. And lastly, at inefficiently high levels of public 
goods, increases in taxes will cause housing prices to decrease, 𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔ℎ 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗⁄ < 0.9  
                                                 
7 𝑔𝑔ℎ(∙) is defined implicitly by 𝑈𝑈ℎ�𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗�,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗,𝑤𝑤ℎ − 𝑔𝑔ℎ(𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗) − 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗� = max
k≠j
𝑈𝑈ℎ(𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘(𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘),𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤ℎ − 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 − 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘). 
8 In addition to the aforementioned tax constraints placed on municipalities by states, Bayer and McMillan (2012) 
empirically demonstrate that the presence of multiple location attributes can disrupt a Tiebout equilibrium.  
9 Coate (2013) argues that analyses examining house price responses to government spending, such as this paper and 
Cellini et al. (2010), are not theoretically grounded because homeowners with rational expectations should expect a 
8 
 The increase in public goods resulting from the increase in taxes generates value through 
amenities that accrue to residents. Marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) is the present value of 
the infinite stream of amenity values discounted at rate i:  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = �(𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)(1 + 𝑎𝑎)−(𝑡𝑡−1)∞
𝑡𝑡=1
                        (3) 
While current owners benefit from amenity values, they must pay increased taxes in order to 
continue to live there. Because owners are indifferent between staying and moving (potential 
buyers are indifferent as well), the change in house value (capitalization) will be the difference 
between MWTP and the present value of the future tax burden, 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡(∙):10 
𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡(𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡∗′ − 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡∗)                        (4) 
This equation introduces a time subscript, which was omitted above for simplification. The 
reason for this is that while improving some public goods requires a permanent increase in taxes, 
other cases (e.g., land conservation, school infrastructure) require a finite investment. This is 
consistent with bond financing, which allows a community to pay a large upfront cost and entails 
a term repayment. In the context of voting on referendums, the year of the referendum is 𝑠𝑠 = 0, 
the year after the referendum is 𝑠𝑠 = 1, and so on. If the referendum passes, taxes are first 
increased at 𝑠𝑠 = 1. If tax increases are term, then 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡(∙) will decrease over time and eventually 
equal zero, hence the need for time subscripts. While the temporal evolution of tax payments in 
unknown to the researcher, the total tax bill is known and equals 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇1. Thus, capitalization at 
𝑠𝑠 = 1 is the estimable version of Equation (2) that defines the test of efficiency: 
Test of Efficiency: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗1 �> 0= 0< 0�  𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗∗� 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 �𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢 �  
This test assumes that market capitalization of amenity improvements and taxes is immediate.  
                                                 
certain level of public services and not be surprised by passage of new spending. However, there are two reasons to 
believe this may not hold. First, as noted in the introduction, many states require voter authorization to increase 
taxes. Second, an open space referendum may be fundamentally different than school funding due to the 
irreversibility of land development. While a failed education referendum may have little long term effect as later 
funding can be adjusted, a failed open space referendum may lead to development of an important parcel of land. 
10 Kuminoff and Pope (2014) caution against equating capitalization and MWTP. 
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While assessing efficiency is the primary goal, this theory has testable implications for 
how taxes are capitalized into home values.11 Equation (4) implies that for two time periods t and 
s, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 =  𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗. Because benefits of public goods 
stay constant, tax bill declines will be perfectly absorbed into housing prices to maintain 
equilibrium. In the context of finite increases in taxes, this implies that capitalization will 
increase over time.  
Test of Tax Capitalization: If 𝑠𝑠 > 𝑠𝑠 > 0 and 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡(∙) < 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗(∙), then 
𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 >  𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
Lastly, this model can speak to voting behavior. In his book The Homevoter Hypothesis, 
Fischel argues that homeowners will vote on local public goods based on how the proposed 
spending change will impact their property values. In the context of this model, the initial vote 
on a referendum will be influenced by the expected capitalization the spending would cause. 
Test of the Homevoter Hypothesis: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗1 �> 0= 0< 0�  𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠 𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 � 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑀𝑀𝑔𝑔𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �  
However, this prediction rests on the assumptions that residents vote based only on capitalization 
and their expectations about capitalization are correct.  
 The tests of efficiency, tax capitalization, and the homevoter hypothesis all depend on the 
estimated capitalization, which is the major focus of the next several sections of the paper. Once 
the price response is estimated, I will return to these tests. 
 
3  OPEN SPACE REFERENDUMS: BACKGROUND AND DATA 
 Public referendums have become an important and popular tool to raise funds for open 
space conservation. According to The Trust for Public Land (2013), over $72 billion have been 
raised for conservation through referendums since 1988, which is about $2.6 billion per year. In 
comparison, the federal government spends about $2.5 billion for the conservation reserve 
                                                 
11 Equation (2) assumes perfect tax capitalization, but does not generate a testable hypothesis because tax and 
amenity capitalization cannot be separated.  
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program (Nelson et al. 2007), and the 2014 annual programmatic expenses of The Nature 
Conservancy was $541 million.12  
 While states and counties hold open space referendums, the focus of this paper is on 
municipalities that raise funds in this manner. The reason for this focus is to test the efficiency of 
municipal open space provision, consistent with prior tests of local public good efficiency (Oates 
1969, Brueckner 1979, 1982). Further, the benefits of preservation are concentrated, in contrast 
to county and especially state efforts. Municipalities holding referendums are typically in the 
rural-urban fringe where development pressure is highest. Figure 1 illustrates the spatial 
distribution of referendum municipalities, using the Minneapolis-St. Paul metro area. The figure 
shows that communities holding referendums are in suburban areas within commuting distance 
to the center city.  
 Referendum data come from the Trust for Public Land’s (2013) Land Vote Database. For 
each proposed municipal referendum, the data include the date held, percentage of yes votes 
received and required to pass, proposed amount of funding, and vehicle to raise funds (i.e., bonds 
or property taxes). Importantly, the amount of proposed funding is split between funds intended 
for open space conservation and funds for other purposes, typically historic preservation and 
construction of public housing. Sample construction is discussed along with the Zillow housing 
data in Section 5. 
 Table 1 gives summary statistics of municipal open space referendums included in the 
analysis by year. There were few referendums in the 1980s through the mid-1990s, then activity 
increased substantially in the late 1990s and continued through the mid-2000s, until pace slowed 
again. The average municipal referendum proposes $9.1 million in total funding, of which $6.7 
million is dedicated to conservation. I normalize proposed and authorized spending by the 
number of housing units in a municipality. This allows for comparison across more and less 
populous municipalities and gives the approximate present value of future tax burden, 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇1. The 
average amount of spending proposed is $1,132 per housing unit. On average, 75% of that 
funding is dedicated to open space, with 25% going towards other functions. While not shown in 
the table, 98.1% of referendums require a 50% approval share for passage; the remainder 
requires either 60% or two-thirds majority.  
                                                 
12 http://www.nature.org/about-us/our-accountability/annual-report/2014-financial-report-with-report-of-
independent-auditors.pdf 
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 Open space referendums are very popular, as demonstrated by columns 5-7 of Table 1. 
Referendums pass on average 76% of the time, and often pass with a margin exceeding 10%. 
Further, it is common for municipalities to hold more than one referendum over this time span. 
Of the entire sample of referendums, about 38% occur in a municipality that has held an open 
space referendums previously. Since 2002, the proportion is about 53%, and since 2006, the 
proportion is 67%. Incorporating this dynamic behavior to hold multiple referendums is critical 
for estimating capitalization and motivates the dynamic aspect of my research design. Failure to 
include dynamics will result in estimating an intent to treat effect, which may be downward 
biased if municipalities that fail to pass try again and succeed (Cellini et al. 2010, Isen 2014).  
 
4  EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN 
 This section describes the dynamic regression discontinuity design in steps, starting with 
simple models and adding complexity. Suppose municipality j considers a ballot initiative and 
votes in favor of the referendum with vote margin 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗, which equals the percent of yes votes 
minus the required percent for a pass. Let 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 1(𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0) be an indicator for passing the 
referendum. Ignoring time considerations for the moment, the effect of passing an open space 
referendum on outcome 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 (i.e., housing price) can be modeled as: 
𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 = 𝛽𝛽 + 𝜗𝜗𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗                         (6) 
where 𝜗𝜗 is the coefficient of interest. However, 𝜗𝜗 is likely to be biased due to unobserved 
characteristics that determine the outcome and are correlated with passing a referendum. To 
mitigate this problem, an RD design could be applied that essentially compares municipalities 
that just barely pass a referendum to those that just barely fail. In a narrow spectrum of 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 
around the threshold, unobservables should be uncorrelated with 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 and, critically, whether a 
referendum passes or fails is as good as random. Equation (7) additionally controls for 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 using 
a flexible polynomial with corresponding parameters 𝛾𝛾: 
𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 = 𝛽𝛽 + 𝜗𝜗𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 + 𝐼𝐼�𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 , 𝛾𝛾� + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗                        (7) 
Now, 𝜗𝜗 is unbiased and estimates the causal effect of referendum passage on an outcome, under 
the assumption that other determinants of 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 are continuous around 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 = 0.  
 The current setting involves municipalities holding and passing multiple referendums and 
observing multiple years of outcome data, and thus the static framework of Equations (6) and (7) 
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needs to be extended to account for these complexities. The outcome variable is now indexed by 
calendar year t, 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡, and 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 equals one if municipality j passes a referendum in year t and 
zero otherwise. Because passing a referendum can affect the outcome in subsequent years 
beyond the year of the referendum, I model the outcome as a function of all prior referendum 
history (abstracting from the RD component):  
𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = �𝜗𝜗𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏�
𝜏𝜏=0
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡                    (8) 
where 𝜏𝜏 is the number of years since the referendum 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 is a municipality fixed effect, and 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 is a 
year by census division fixed effect. Because the scope of this study is national and housing 
prices have many local and regional determinants, I need to control for house market trends that 
may be correlated with referendum passage. The year by census division fixed effects are a first 
step. Additionally, using Zillow data (detailed in the next section), I construct an annual price 
index for each county, equal to the logged average Zillow price index for each zip code within a 
county. Then, I include this index as an independent variable in all house price specifications to 
capture more local variation in market trends. Ideally, state-by-year or even MSA-by-year fixed 
effects could be included, but these overwhelm the data. In Equation (8), 𝜗𝜗𝜏𝜏 measures the effect 
of passing a referendum 𝜏𝜏 years ago, conditional on other referendum passes. Thus, this equation 
measures treatment on the treated.  
 Combining the RD elements of Equation (7) with the dynamic elements of Equation (8), 
the dynamic RD model developed by Cellini et al. (2010) is formed: 
𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = �[𝜗𝜗𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏�
𝜏𝜏=0
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏 + 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏 + 𝐼𝐼(𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏,𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏)] + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡             (9) 
where 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏 acts as an intercept and is a binary variable equal to one if municipality j holds a 
referendum at time 𝑠𝑠 − 𝜏𝜏 and the polynomial in vote margin is allowed to vary across lagged 
years.  
Cellini et al. additionally estimate a dynamic RD model that substitutes the amount of 
money authorized in the referendum, 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏, for 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏 as the key independent variable: 
𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = �[𝜗𝜗𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏�
𝜏𝜏=0
𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏 + 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏 + 𝐼𝐼(𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏, 𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏)] + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡            (10) 
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I modify this last equation in two ways to arrive at my preferred specification. First, due to the 
fact that referendum-authorized spending is split between open space and other purposes, such as 
public housing and historic preservation, I adjust the specification to separate those types of 
funding: 
𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = �[𝜗𝜗𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏�
𝜏𝜏=0
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏 + 𝜌𝜌𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏 + 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏 + 𝐼𝐼(𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏, 𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏)] +𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡                                                      (11) 
where 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏 and 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏 are the amounts of funding devoted for open space and other 
purposes, respectively. Equation (11) has the causal interpretation and dynamic components of 
Equations (9) and (10), but allows for open space spending and spending for other purposes to 
have different impacts on the outcome. For example, if households view open space as an 
amenity but public housing as a disamenity, 𝜗𝜗𝜏𝜏 and 𝜌𝜌𝜏𝜏 may have opposite signs.  
 The second modification is to add proposed funding amounts for open space and other as 
additional control variables. This stems from a concern that the amount of funding proposed may 
be endogenous. By controlling flexibly for vote margin, whether or not a referendum passes is 
quasi-random close to the threshold. But that is not true for the proposed budget; there may be 
unobserved determinants of house prices that are correlated with amount of funding. By 
controlling for proposed funding, this endogeneity will be captured. 
 Equation (11) with the addition of proposed funding is the preferred specification. 𝜗𝜗𝜏𝜏 is 
interpreted as the causal effect of referendum approved spending on open space 𝜏𝜏 years after 
passage, conditional on other referendums municipality j has held. This is a local average 
treatment effect and only holds for sample municipalities near the threshold.  
 
5  DATA AND SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION 
House price data come from Zillow’s home value index (ZHVI) at the zip code level, the 
finest spatial scale available. Zillow data are being increasingly used in hedonic analyses (e.g., 
Huang and Tang 2012, Weber et al. 2016) because they are publicly available, national in scope, 
and unbiased estimates of actual sales (Bruce 2014). Zillow estimates the value of each house 
within a zip code based on recent, nearby sales and hedonic adjustments for property specific 
characteristics. Thus, Zillow captures the whole distribution of the housing stock and not just the 
distribution of sales in any one time period. This is important in the event that the types of 
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houses being sold change after a referendum passes. It also obviates the need to control for 
housing characteristics, as in a typical hedonic regression. Zillow takes the median estimated 
price for each zip code, applies a 5-month moving average and seasonal adjustment, and then 
reports this as ZHVI.13 The data were downloaded in November 2013 at the month-zip code 
level and date back to January 1997. In order to build a zip-year panel, I averaged observations 
for months May through October, which correspond to peak season of transactions and the 
months prior to November when most referendums occur. Averaging across months and omitting 
November through April has the additional benefit of removing serial correlation created by the 
moving average involved in the construction of ZHVI.  
There are a total 1,747 municipal referendums held in the continental United States 
during 1988-2012. Municipalities were manually matched to zip codes using multiple sources 
such as town websites, zipmap.net and Wikipedia. A zip code match could not be made for all 
municipalities, and this drops 7.1% of referendums. Some municipalities match to zip codes for 
which there is no Zillow index, which drops 11.7% of referendums.14 I additionally restrict the 
sample to municipalities with four or fewer zip codes, in an effort to exclude large municipalities 
where the benefits may be too diffuse for impacts to be measured. This reduces the referendum 
sample by 15.2%. Robustness checks are presented in Section 7 that vary the number of zip 
codes allowed, but never are large cities included. Lastly, I drop the top and bottom one 
percentile, which makes the effective sample range of vote margin [-22.4, 35.3]. This exclusion 
is intended to drop referendums that failed or passed by exceptional margins and may be 
abnormal in other ways. In final, the sample includes 1,145 referendums in 710 municipalities 
represented by 933 zip codes and a total of 15,396 zip-year observations. Because some 
municipalities contain more than one zip code, standard errors are clustered at the municipality 
level.  
                                                 
13 Median house prices have been used frequently in hedonic studies, mostly derived from decennial census data 
(e.g., Chay and Greenstone 2005, Bento et al. 2015). However, some research casts doubt on the use of median 
prices (e.g., Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins 2013, Banzhaf and Farooque 2013) suggesting median prices may not 
recover statistically significant treatment effects or may estimate a treatment effect that is not representative of the 
whole price distribution. Coefficient estimates presented in Section 7 are statistically significant, alleviating one 
concern, but future research could examine distributional impacts of conservation.  
14 As of 2014, ZHVI covered about 10 thousand of the roughly 32 thousand zip codes in the United States. Low 
population zip codes are not publicly available due to accuracy concerns. 
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I additionally collected municipal level data on construction permits from the Census 
Bureau.15 Specifically, these data measure the annual number of new housing units permitted. 
These are merged with the referendum data to form a municipal-year panel. Similar as with the 
housing data, I create a county level index of new construction permits and include this in 
regressions with permit data as the dependent variable. 
I collected and calculated several zip and municipal level variables. From the 2000 
Decennial Census, I gathered socioeconomic and housing variables at the municipal level. With 
exception of total housing units, which is used to normalize the proposed and approved 
referendum spending, these variables are only used to understand what types of municipalities 
are holding referendums and how communities that pass referendums may be different than 
communities in which referendums fail. Lastly, I calculated the proportion of a zip code’s area 
that is undevelopable using GIS, 30x30 meter elevation data from USGS, and the 2001 National 
Land Cover Database. Following Saiz (2010), I define undevelopable as either being open water 
or wetland or as having a slope greater than 15%.  
 
6  OPEN SPACE REFERENDUMS AS A QUASI-EXPERIMENT 
 This paper exploits a discrete change in open space spending created by voting outcomes. 
For referendums with vote margins sufficiently close to the threshold, authorization of funding is 
as good as random. Causal inference of the effect of open space spending on housing prices 
assumes that municipalities with vote margins close to the threshold are similar in observable 
and unobservable ways. While this assumption is untestable, voting patterns can be examined for 
strategic behavior and observable characteristics can be compared in levels and trends to test for 
balance.  
 The top panel of Figure 2 displays the density of referendums by vote margin. Reiterating 
Table 1, the figure illustrates the popularity of open space referendums. While there is an 
increase in the frequency of observations on the positive side of the threshold, the increase is not 
statistically significant (McCrary p-value=0.12, rddensity p-value=0.20).16 While municipalities 
may try a second referendum if the first attempt fails, at worst this situation would fall under 
                                                 
15 http://censtats.census.gov/bldg/bldgprmt.shtml 
16 See Appendix Figures A1-A4 for additional exploration of density plots and details of the McCrary and rddensity 
tests.  
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what McCrary (2008) defines as partial manipulation, as each outcome is a function of thousands 
of votes, and will still identify unbiased estimates.  
 The bottom panel of Figure 2 examines how proposed funding changes by vote margin. 
Again, there is noise, but funding for open space and other purposes are similar on either side of 
the threshold (p-value is 0.192 for open space funds and 0.330 for other funds). Within 5% of the 
threshold, the average proposed funding for open space is $813 and for other purposes is $324. 
For other funding, there is a slight downward trend as vote margin increases, which could 
suggest that funding for historic preservation or public housing is less popular with voters than 
open space or just that places that pass open space referendums by a large margin tend to put less 
funding for other projects for unobservable reasons.  
 Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample municipalities in terms of 
socioeconomic, land use, and housing characteristics. From Column 1, the average municipality 
has a median household income over $67,000, has a population nearly 40% of whom have a 
college degree, voted over 56% for the Democratic candidate in the 2000 presidential election, 
and 71% of the housing stock is owner occupied. About 19% of land is undevelopable. The 
average house price in the year prior to an open space referendum vote is about $291,000 and 
increased 7% since a year earlier. Since most of the sample referendums occurred during the 
housing boom, the 7% annual increase is reasonable. In the year prior to a vote, the average 
municipality approved permits to build 145 new housing units, and this was down 9 units from 
the year prior. 
 Columns 2 and 3 present means for municipalities that pass versus fail an open space 
referendum, respectively, and Column 4 gives the difference in means and associated standard 
errors. Municipalities that pass are less dense with 339 fewer people per square mile. A greater 
share of residents has a college degree in municipalities that pass, though incomes and political 
ideology are similar. Houses are worth less and there are more building permits in municipalities 
that pass.  
 Critical for the RD design, municipalities close to the threshold need to be similar. To 
assess this, Columns 5 and 6 test for differences in municipalities using two RD methods: 
Column 5 uses a global polynomial similar in the same vein as Equation (11) and Column 6 uses 
local linear. In contrast to the overall comparison, no municipal characteristics show any 
statistical discontinuity at the threshold. Most importantly, house price and new housing permit 
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trends show no difference. These findings lend credence to the assumption that treatment is as 
good as random for municipalities that barely fail or barely pass.  
 
7  RESULTS 
 Table 3 presents the main results from estimating Equation (11). While Equation (11) 
assumes that pre-referendum treatment effects are zero, this is a testable hypothesis. The results 
presented include three years of pre-referendum treatment effects and ten years of post-
referendum treatment effects. The first column shows point estimates resulting from referendum 
authorized open space spending in units of $1000 per housing unit, with standard errors shown 
below (clustered at the municipality level). The second column gives the same quantities for 
authorized funding for other purposes.  
 The results show that open space spending has no statistical effect on prices in the year of 
the referendum or any of the years preceding the referendum, but one year following prices have 
increased a statistically significant 0.68%. For the years following, coefficients range from 
0.0072 to 0.0112, are statistically significant for all years, and trend upwards slightly. To 
reiterate interpretation, the coefficient on open space spending two years post referendum is 
0.0074, which indicates that a municipality that barely authorizes $1000 of open space spending 
per household is expected to have house prices rise 0.74% after two years relative to a 
municipality that barely fails to authorize open space spending, conditional on spending on other 
purposes and on open space spending that has happened before or after. The consistency of 
coefficients suggests a sustained impact of conservation, which is intuitive given the permanence 
of land conservation. We will return to these estimates in Section 8 when assessing efficiency, 
tax capitalization, and the homevoter hypothesis.  
Shifting to Column 2 of Table 3, approved funding for other purposes shows no 
discernable effect on house prices. Coefficients flip signs often, are always insignificant, and are 
smaller in magnitude than the estimates for open space spending. Given the catchall nature of the 
“other spending” category, it is possible that these estimates are averages of multiple and 
offsetting effects.17  
                                                 
17 For example, Diamond and McQuade (2016) find that affordable housing can have positive or negative spillover 
effects to nearby property values. 
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The appendix presents many additional results pertaining to inclusion of various 
covariates, changes in vote margin sample truncation, use of local linear RD methods, as well as 
models that combine funding for different sources and models that do not condition on past 
referendums. In total, these additional results indicate robust findings and the importance of the 
dynamic modeling strategy that accounts for different types of funding. 
 
7.1 Robustness checks 
Table 4 offers a series of robustness checks that seek to bolster the main results on the 
capitalization of open space spending. For brevity, only the coefficients for four years post 
referendum are shown. The first row gives the corresponding coefficient from Table 3 for 
comparison purposes. Panel A varies how vote margin, the running variable, enters the 
specification. The second row uses only a quadratic polynomial, instead of a cubic. The third row 
reverts to using the cubic polynomial and additionally adds a linear function of vote margin 
interacted with a dummy for passage and dummies for each calendar year. This specification is 
meant to control for the possibility that the unobservables leading to endogeneity may be 
different across years. The fourth row extends this specification and uses a quadratic in vote 
margin interacted with dummies for each calendar year. Coefficients from all three specifications 
are consistent with the main results. The last row in Panel A omits vote margin as a control 
variable altogether, making it a difference-in-difference model. The coefficient here is about 
40% smaller in magnitude and less statistically significant, which suggests that the RD design is 
important and the vote margin control is able to capture variation in unobservables. 
 Panel B reports estimates from thresholds other than 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 = 0 to show that the 
discontinuity in house price effects observed at 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 = 0 is not spurious. Rows 6 and 7 test 
whether a house price effect occurs at 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 = −10 and 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 = 10, respectively. Neither alternative 
threshold shows a price effect.  
 Panel C examines how alternative ways of constructing the data affect results. For each 
row, the specification is identical to that in the main results, but each changes the maximum 
number of zip codes a municipality is allowed to have in order to be included in the sample. The 
main sample allows a maximum of four, and these specifications allow one, two and six, 
respectively. This changes the sample from 15,396 to 8,618, 12,048, and 17,790, respectively. 
The coefficients are slightly larger in magnitude for one and two zip codes, but smaller for six, 
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and the R2s decline monotonically as the number of zip codes included increases. These results 
could suggest that capitalization is more diffuse in larger municipalities and thus a smaller 
capitalization occurs for the median house.  
 
7.2 Assessing supply side effects 
If land slated for development is unavailable for new housing units, this could reduce the 
future supply of homes (relative to the counterfactual) and cause equilibrium prices to increase. 
Thus, the capitalization resulting from referendum-authorized open space spending may not be 
due to amenity valuation, but instead to supply side effects. I present two sets of results that seek 
to assess the degree to which the mechanism underlying the price response is a restriction in 
housing supply. The first test applies the logic that municipalities that are already land 
constrained will likely experience a greater negative supply shock and resulting price increase 
than municipalities that are not land constrained. Following Saiz’s (2010) formulation of 
geographical constraints to development, I calculate the proportion of each zip code that is either 
open water, wetland, or sloped greater than 15%. I then normalize this variable into a z-score and 
interact it with referendum authorized spending. If supply side effects are driving the house price 
response, then the sign on the interaction would be positive because spending in areas with more 
undevelopable land leads to a greater price increase than in areas with less undevelopable land.18  
Table 5 presents results, with the first column giving the main effect of authorized open 
space spending and the second column giving the interaction term. The main effect coefficients 
are quite similar to Table 3, which is expected given that the interaction variable has mean zero, 
though there is some loss of precision. The coefficients on the interaction are almost all negative, 
a few are statistically significant, and the magnitude tends to decline over time. To aid 
interpretation, consider the following. Three years post referendum the average house price 
response to $1,000 per housing unit of authorized referendum spending is about 0.67%. For zip 
codes with proportion of undevelopable area one standard deviation greater than the mean, 
capitalization will be 0.44% less than the mean or 0.23%. A zip code with undevelopable area 
                                                 
18 Hilber and Mayer (2009) conduct a similar test with school spending and find that capitalization is greater in land 
constrained areas. However, in the context of RD, Calonico et al. (2016) caution against interaction with the 
treatment variable. Given the exploratory nature of this regression, I proceed with that caveat. For further 
demonstration of the explanatory power of the measure of undevelopable land, in the appendix I replicate basic 
results from Saiz (2010) regarding house price levels and changes.  
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one standard deviation less than the mean has expected capitalization of 1.11%. These findings 
do not support the hypothesis that housing supply restrictions drive capitalization, in fact they 
argue the opposite. One possible explanation for these results rests on a demand side story 
instead. Areas with lots of undevelopable land have abundant natural amenities in the way of 
lakes, wetlands, and hills. If there are diminishing marginal benefits of open space, then 
additional land preservation in these areas may yield a smaller marginal benefit than in areas 
with little natural impediment to development. However, the interaction coefficients do decline 
in magnitude over time, which suggests that price responses for areas with disparate geographies 
converge.  
The second test switches from examining a housing price response to a construction 
response. I estimate Equation (11) with the log of new construction permits as the dependent 
variable. This variable counts each unit of housing permitted, and thus would account for 
changes in the types of housing (i.e., single family to multi-family) resulting from land 
conservation. If supply was constrained from conservation, the expected sign on the coefficients 
would be negative.  
The results, displayed in Table 6, suggest that open space spending does not affect 
building permits. Coefficients are mostly positive, but do flip signs, and are never statistically 
significant.19 These results again suggest that a supply side effect is not driving the price 
response. One explanation is that municipalities are not trying to curtail development as a whole, 
just development in a specific place or places, possibly as part of a larger smart growth 
strategy.20 Alternatively, new construction could be impacted both by a supply restriction and 
increased demand for an area due to increased amenities, which would offset.  
While neither set of results empirically supports a supply side response, neither 
definitively rules it out either. I proceed cautiously under the assumption that capitalization is 
due to amenities.  
 
                                                 
19 The second column examines how funding for historic preservation, public housing and other purposes than open 
space impacts new construction. Interestingly, most coefficients are negative and many are statistically significant. 
There are several possible stories for why this may be: historic preservation may reduce the need for new 
construction or public housing crowds out new (non-public) construction. Again, given the catchall nature of this 
category, it is inappropriate to draw strong conclusions. 
20 Often, the referendum language identifies a specific parcel, such as “Bond for the preservation of 140 acres of 
farmland known as the Jones Family Farm” in Shelton, CT.  
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8  EFFICIENCY, TAX CAPITALIZATION, AND THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 
 From Section 2, the test of efficient provision of local public goods hinges on the sign of 
capitalization. The empirical models in this paper are designed to test how exogenous increases 
in spending on local land conservation affect housing prices, which capitalize the benefits of 
conservation and the necessary tax increases. The main results in Section 7.1 suggest a positive 
and statistically significant house price response, which indicates that the provision of local open 
space conservation is inefficient and underprovided. One additional assumption needed for this 
conclusion is that the median house value capitalization is representative of the average. While 
median prices were used by Oates (1969) and Brueckner (1979), Brueckner (1982) makes clear 
that a true test of efficiency requires aggregate or average housing values. In the particular 
context of land conservation, median capitalization may be attenuated from the average because 
the median is unlikely to capture price change of houses proximate to conserved land, which are 
likely the largest.21  
 The test of tax capitalization asserted that capitalization should increase annually at the 
rate that the future tax burden declines. Table 3 indicated increasing coefficients, consistent with 
that assertion. For further investigation, Figure 3 displays estimated dollar values of 
capitalization resulting from Table 3 for years 1-10 following a referendum, assuming mean 
values of conservation spending ($813 per housing unit) and housing values ($282,383) near the 
threshold. The pattern is generally increasing and a simple linear regression of capitalization on 
year yields a slope of 103.99 (std. err. = 23.33, R2 = 0.71). Under the premise of perfect tax 
capitalization, the estimated slope would imply that the future tax burden declines by $104 per 
year. The LandVote data do not contain detailed information on funding structures such as term 
lengths for bonds or expiration dates for tax increases, thus the $104 per year cannot be 
validated. However, to give a sense of magnitude, a 10-year bond for $813 per housing unit with 
a 5% interest rate, both of which are reasonable for a municipal bond, would average an $81.30 
per year reduction in future tax burden.22 Thus, the annual increase in capitalization seems a bit 
                                                 
21 Additional support comes from Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2013), who examine how housing prices 
respond to superfund remediation across the whole price distribution. Their results suggest that the median price 
impact is similar to the average impact, but is slightly attenuated because of larger impacts that occur at one tail. 
22 Calculation details available in the appendix. 
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larger than expected. Possible conflating factors are delays in spending or benefits that exceed 
expectations. However, on the whole, the empirical findings strongly support tax capitalization.  
 The test of the homevoter hypothesis stated that homeowners will vote in accordance 
with efficiency impacts of the referendum. To judge this prediction, we must examine the 
capitalization effects of passage of the whole referendum, not just the portion for open space. 
Appendix Table A5 presents results from a model that only uses a binary passage variable as the 
key independent variable (Equation 9) and does not split funding between open space and other 
purposes. The results suggest passage has no statistical effect on housing prices – coefficients are 
all statistical zeros and flip signs. Given these findings, homeowners should be indifferent 
between voting yes or no. Given that a RD design was used, the estimates are only valid around 
the threshold, where voters are indeed indifferent. Thus, the results support the homevoter 
hypothesis. This conclusion rests on two assumptions. First, the median voter is a homeowner, 
which seems reasonable given that sample towns are comprised of 71.5% owners. Second, the 
median voter experiences a similar property value response as the median house, which was also 
necessary for tax capitalization and discussed in the prior paragraph.  
 
9  CONCLUSION 
There are essentially two ways for citizens to register their demand for local public 
goods, voting and residential choice. This paper incorporates both means of demand 
revelation in the context municipal open space referendums, which are a popular means to 
permanently preserve undeveloped land. My primary focus is to assess the efficiency of local 
open space provision. Using a dynamic RD research design based on referendum outcomes, I 
estimate that housing prices increase about 0.68-1.12% for every $1000 per household of 
referendum approved open space spending. This finding indicates that households value land 
conservation more than the additional cost of taxes, and thus efficiency increases when open 
space spending increases. However, drawing on the intuitive findings of prior open space 
valuation literature, there are almost certainly within-municipality differences in benefits 
based on proximity to conserved lands, and perhaps characteristics such as income as well. 
Future research that can integrate municipality-wide efficiency aims, as well as distributional 
impacts, would be most valuable for efficient and equitable policy decisions.  
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The main capitalization results suggest that residential choice is not leading to 
efficient provision of local open space. Returning to the idea that there are two ways to 
register demand, the results can also be used to evaluate whether voting guides municipalities 
to efficient outcomes. The findings of this paper suggest that there are substantial net benefits 
for current residents from referendum authorized municipal open space spending. However, 
these open space referendums are frequently combined with spending on other purposes, 
such as affordable housing and historic preservation, and results also suggest that passage of 
a referendum in its totality does not increase efficiency. This raises additional questions for 
future research about why various objectives are combined in a single referendum and how 
the political process affects the efficient provision of local public goods.  
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Figure 1: Illustration of spatial distribution of open space referendums overlaying population 
density using Minneapolis-St. Paul 
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Figure 2: Distribution of sample referendums and proposed funding by vote margin 
 
 
Notes: Figure includes only those open space referendums in the main sample, which includes all years 1988-2012, 
excludes those with a vote margin less than -20 or exceeding 35, and excludes referendums that match to zip codes 
lacking house price data or that match to municipalities with greater than 4 zip codes. Vote margin equals the 
percent of yes votes minus the percent needed to pass. Referendums are grouped by vote margins in bins of 2%. 
Proposed spending is split by funds allocated for open space preservation and those allocated for other purposes, 
such as public housing and historic preservation.  
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Figure 3: Capitalization trends following referendum 
 
Notes: Estimated capitalization is the product of the average house price for municipalities passing an open space 
referendum with a vote margin less than 5% ($282,383.0) and the corresponding coefficient for years 1-10 from 
Table 3, scaled by the size of the average referendum within 5% of the threshold ($812.8 per household). The 
standard error for the slope coefficient is 23.33 and the t-statistic is 4.46. 
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Table 1: Open space referendum summary statistics 
Year 
Number of 
referendums 
Avg. 
amount 
proposed 
per house 
unit ($) 
Fraction of 
proposed 
funds 
dedicated to 
open space 
Fraction that 
held previous 
referendum 
Fraction 
approved 
Average 
 vote 
margin 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1988 13 385 0.85 0.00 0.92 13.39 
1989 8 1,254 0.98 0.13 0.75 6.04 
1990 11 436 0.97 0.18 0.73 8.19 
1991 2 649 0.92 0.00 0.50 -0.23 
1992 12 399 0.93 0.00 0.75 7.39 
1993 12 601 0.97 0.17 0.75 7.33 
1994 13 704 0.92 0.38 0.85 11.43 
1995 16 876 0.79 0.19 0.69 9.79 
1996 37 869 0.81 0.24 0.73 8.95 
1997 33 1,295 0.87 0.21 0.94 12.36 
1998 92 863 0.77 0.14 0.86 12.13 
1999 53 1,057 0.89 0.28 0.91 14.80 
2000 119 1,250 0.55 0.19 0.79 9.69 
2001 111 923 0.68 0.28 0.68 6.39 
2002 73 1,015 0.76 0.49 0.78 10.92 
2003 77 1,117 0.83 0.43 0.75 8.03 
2004 113 1,371 0.71 0.50 0.82 10.24 
2005 67 1,369 0.77 0.58 0.69 4.89 
2006 90 1,582 0.80 0.46 0.74 6.70 
2007 52 1,239 0.78 0.54 0.60 6.99 
2008 44 1,285 0.78 0.61 0.68 6.64 
2009 25 1,151 0.64 0.68 0.60 5.18 
2010 18 892 0.67 0.72 0.72 4.79 
2011 19 1,484 0.73 0.74 0.58 6.01 
2012 35 992 0.65 0.66 0.74 7.62 
Mean 45.8 1,132 0.75 0.38 0.76 8.78 
Notes: Data obtained from TPL Land Vote Database. Dollar amounts are normalized by the number of housing 
units within a given municipality, which were obtained from the 2000 Decennial Census. Vote margin equals the 
proportion of yes votes minus the proportion needed to pass. 
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Table 2: Municipality descriptive statistics and pre-referendum balance of treatment and control groups 
 
All 
municipalities 
Municipalities that 
ever fail a referendum 
Municipalities that 
ever pass a referendum 
Difference in 
means 
Difference 
Global RD 
Difference 
Local RD 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Socioeconomic variables       
Total Population 24954.5 24620.4 25061.1 440.7 9554.8 8370.3 
 (36338.1) (35271.6) (36691.2) (2508.7) (7939.3) (5839.5) 
Population density (per sq. mile) 1501.1 1758.2 1419.0 -339.1 369.7 221.6 
 (1806.2) (2000.9) (1732.6) (124.3)*** (393.3) (434.1) 
Median household income ($) 67048.7 65535.3 67531.6 1996.3 -3112.1 -3792.5 
 (21987.6) (20245.9) (22504.8) (1516.8) (4812.8) (6089.7) 
Owner occupied housing (%) 71.47 72.01 71.30 -0.71 -3.53 -2.96 
 (16.06) (14.94) (16.40) (1.11) (3.52) (4.19) 
College or more (%) 39.98 37.33 40.83 3.50 -1.26 -2.45 
 (15.04) (14.26) (15.19) (1.03)*** (3.26) (4.02) 
Democrat (%) 55.63 56.14 55.47 -0.67 0.81 2.78 
 (9.61) (9.60) (9.61) (0.66) (2.11) (2.82)        
B. Land use data       
% undevelopable 19.12 20.15 18.80 -1.35 3.70 2.30 
 (16.16) (17.76) (15.61) (1.12) (3.53) (4.40)        
C. Housing data       
House prices (t-1) 291208.1 308095.1 285507.6 -22587.6 24601.0 11838.9 
 (183154.5) (187171.5) (181557.9) (13689.3)* (43178.6) (43681.0) 
Change in house prices (%) 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
New housing permits (t-1) 145.02 109.85 156.53 46.69 100.16 79.98 
 (277.05) (206.48) (295.75) (21.72)** (66.53) (74.86) 
Change in permits (t-1)-(t-2) -9.41 -14.04 -7.83 6.20 -36.93 -43.69 
 (148.34) (186.97) (132.72) (12.38) (38.84) (36.59) 
Notes: Columns 1-3 present means and standard deviations in parentheses. Columns 4-6 present estimated differences in means and standard errors. The 
regressions leading to Column 5 control for a cubic polynomial in vote margin interacted with an indicator for pass. Column 6 applies the estimator developed by 
Calonico et al. (2014). Socioeconomic data come from the 2000 Decennial Census. Democrat vote share is at the county level and comes from the 2000 election. 
% undevelopable is the proportion of area within a zip code's boundary that is either open water or wetland or has slope greater than 15%. Open water and 
wetland data come the National Land Cover Database and slope was calculated from 30x30 meter digital elevation data from USGS. House prices come from the 
Zillow all home index. New building permit data are from the Census Bureau. For house prices and permits, t-1 refers to the year before a referendum is held and 
t-2 is two years before. 
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Table 3: The effect of authorized referendum spending on log housing prices 
 $1000 per housing unit in: 
 Open space funding Other funding 
  (1) (2) 
3 years prior -0.0008 0.0008 
 (0.0022) (0.0017) 
2 years prior 0.0015 0.0020 
 (0.0026) (0.0016) 
1 year prior 0.0036 -0.0001 
 (0.0027) (0.0017) 
Year of referendum 0.0044 0.0010 
 (0.0032) (0.0017) 
1 year later 0.0068 0.0004 
 (0.0027)** (0.0018) 
2 years later 0.0074 0.0013 
 (0.0025)*** (0.0018) 
3 years later 0.0082 -0.0006 
 (0.0026)*** (0.0018) 
4 years later 0.0072 -0.0006 
 (0.0028)*** (0.0021) 
5 years later 0.0087 0.0009 
 (0.0031)*** (0.0019) 
6 years later 0.0104 -0.0005 
 (0.0030)*** (0.0019) 
7 years later 0.0103 -0.0007 
 (0.0032)*** (0.0019) 
8 years later 0.0112 -0.0009 
 (0.0025)*** (0.0018) 
9 years later 0.0110 -0.0016 
 (0.0026)*** (0.0021) 
10 years later 0.0095 0.0006 
  (0.0043)** (0.0014) 
Notes: Results shown are from a single regression. The specification follows Equation (11) with the 
dependent variable being the log of the Zillow all home index, the key independent variables being 
referendum authorized spending per housing unit (split by funding for open space and funding for other 
purposes) interacted with three lead years, the year of the referendum, and 10 lag years. Controls include 
a third order polynomial in vote margin interacted with an indicator for passage and interacted with all 
lead and lag years, an indicator variable for the presence of a referendum interacted with all lead and lag 
years, proposed funding amounts interacted with all lead and lag years, year by census division fixed 
effects, a county level annual price index, and zip code fixed effects. The number of zip-year 
observations is 15,396 and the R2 is 0.992. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated 
using the Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the municipality 
level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 4: Alternative specifications for the effect of referendum spending 
  
Effect of $1000 of open 
space funding approved 
on log house prices 4 
years after referendum 
Baseline (from Table 3) 0.0072 
 (0.0028)***   
A. Alternative specifications  
Quadratic 0.0080 
 (0.0028)*** 
Linear x year interaction 0.0072 
 (0.0028)*** 
Quadratic x year interaction 0.0072 
 (0.0028)*** 
Difference-in-difference 0.0044 
 (0.0024)*   
B. Placebo thresholds  
Actual threshold minus 10 -0.0031 
 (0.0040) 
Actual threshold plus 10 -0.0015 
 (0.0058)   
C. Alternative data construction  
Municipalities containing one zip code 0.0127 
 (0.0051)** 
Municipalities containing two or fewer zip codes 0.0133 
 (0.0049)*** 
Municipalities containing six or fewer zip codes 0.0056 
 (0.0027)** 
Notes: Each coefficient comes from a separate regression. The first row replicates the main results 
from Table 3. The second row uses only a quadratic polynomial in vote margin, instead of a cubic. 
The third row reverts to using the cubic polynomial and additionally adds a linear function of vote 
margin interacted with dummies for each calendar year and a dummy for passage. The fourth row 
extends this specification and uses a quadratic in vote margin interacted with dummies for each 
calendar year. Row 5 is a difference-in-difference specification that excludes any function of vote 
margin. Rows 6 and 7 test whether a house price effect occurs at vm=-10 and vm=10, respectively. 
In both specifications, the main effect at vm=0 is still included. For each model in Panel C, the 
specification is identical to that in the main results. Rows 8-10 change the maximum allowable zip 
codes a municipality is allowed to have in order to be included in the sample to one, two and six, 
respectively. The sample size for these rows are 8,618, 12,048, and 17,790, and the R2s are 0.9930, 
0.9924, and 0.9917, respectively. 
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Table 5: Heterogeneity in house price response due to undevelopable land 
 
Effect of $1,000 per housing unit in open space 
spending  
 
Main effect Interacted with % undevelopable (z-score) 
3 years prior -0.0010 -0.0003 
 (0.0036) (0.0030) 
2 years prior 0.0013 0.0005 
 (0.0033) (0.0027) 
1 year prior 0.0041 -0.0029 
 (0.0034) (0.0028) 
Year of referendum 0.0041 -0.0064 
 (0.0037) (0.0030)** 
1 year later 0.0059 -0.0060 
 (0.0035)* (0.0030)** 
2 years later 0.0057 -0.0049 
 (0.0033)* (0.0030) 
3 years later 0.0067 -0.0044 
 (0.0031)** (0.0027) 
4 years later 0.0075 -0.0024 
 (0.0032)** (0.0025) 
5 years later 0.0072 -0.0054 
 (0.0034)** (0.0026)** 
6 years later 0.0098 -0.0030 
 (0.0036)*** (0.0028) 
7 years later 0.0091 -0.0043 
 (0.0040)** (0.0037) 
8 years later 0.0102 -0.0005 
 (0.0035)*** (0.0031) 
9 years later 0.0113 0.0015 
 (0.0036)*** (0.0030) 
10 years later 0.0070 -0.0002 
  (0.0047) (0.0038) 
Notes: Results shown are from a single regression. Specification is identical to that shown in Table 3, 
except that the percentage of undevelopable area in a zip code (transformed into a z-score) is interacted 
with authorized open space and other spending and proposed open space and other spending. The zip-
year sample is identical to Table 3 and the R2 is 0.992. See Table 3 for more details.  
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Table 6: The effect of referendum spending on log construction permits 
 $1000 per housing unit in: 
 Open space funding Other funding 
  (1) (2) 
3 years prior 0.0654 0.0038 
 (0.0508) (0.0159) 
2 years prior 0.0002 -0.0039 
 (0.0540) (0.0148) 
1 year prior 0.0159 -0.0190 
 (0.0558) (0.0171) 
Year of referendum 0.0240 -0.0299 
 (0.0562) (0.0150)** 
1 year later -0.0203 -0.0253 
 (0.0633) (0.0226) 
2 years later 0.0227 -0.0019 
 (0.0666) (0.0194) 
3 years later 0.0341 -0.0189 
 (0.0608) (0.0244) 
4 years later 0.0440 -0.0569 
 (0.0598) (0.0221)** 
5 years later -0.0087 -0.0626 
 (0.0600) (0.0167)*** 
6 years later 0.0347 -0.0297 
 (0.0661) (0.0165)* 
7 years later 0.0082 -0.0590 
 (0.0657) (0.0165)*** 
8 years later 0.0595 -0.0704 
 (0.0622) (0.0206)*** 
9 years later 0.0252 -0.0512 
 (0.0614) (0.0139)*** 
10 years later 0.0069 -0.0005 
 (0.0773) (0.0132) 
Notes: Results shown are from a single regression. The specification follows Equation (11) with 
the dependent variable being the log (construction permits+1), the key independent variables 
being referendum authorized spending per housing unit (split by funding for open space and 
funding for other purposes) interacted with three lead years, the year of the referendum, and 10 
lag years. Controls include a third order polynomial in vote margin interacted with an indicator 
for passage and interacted with all lead and lag years, an indicator variable for the presence of a 
referendum interacted with all lead and lag years, proposed funding amounts interacted with all 
lead and lag years, year by census division fixed effects, a county level annual construction 
permit index, and municipality fixed effects. The number of municipality-year observations is 
13,083 and the R2 is 0.782. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using the 
Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the municipality 
level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
 
